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RESUMEN 
Se analiza el prejuicio contra minorías ét-
nicas como el establecimiento de la diferen-
cia entre los grupos sociales en dimensiones 
valoradas y también como la negación de 
las semejanzas evitando la inclusión de en-
dogrupos y exogrupos en la categoría supe-
rior de seres  humanos. E sta investigación 
analiza en la minoría gitana los dos concep-
tos que se utilizan para describir el fenóme-
no de la deshumanización de grupos ajenos: 
su ontologización e infrahumanización.  Se 
pidió a los británicos y rumanos de la mues-
tra que clasificaran a su grupo nacional y a 
los gitanos  a partir de  las características 
juzgadas típicamente humanas y típicamen-
te animales según la literatura teórica de la 
ontologización  e infrahumanización. Los 
resultados indicaron que la ontologización 
de los gitanos ocurre en ambas muestras 
nacionales mientras que su i nfrahumani-
zation solo ocurre en los participantes britá-
nicos. Se analizan las implicaciones de los 
resultados desde la perspectiva de infrahu-
manización y ontologisation.  
ABSTRACT 
Prejudice against ethnic minorities is inves-
tigated not only as the establishment of 
difference between social groups on valued 
dimensions but also as the denial of simi-
larities that would prevent the inclusion of 
both ingroups and outgroups in the s u-
perordinate category of human-beings. The 
present study sought to explore the two 
concepts that are advanced to describe the 
phenomenon of dehumanisation of out-
groups: their ontologisation and their infra-
humanisation in relation to the Gypsy mi-
nority. British  and Romanian  participants 
were asked to rate their national ingroup 
and the Gypsies using characteristics judged 
typically human and typically animal fo-
llowing the ontologisation and infrahumani-
sation literature. The results indicated that 
the ontologisation of the Gypsies occurs in 
both national samples whereas their infra-
humanisation is only verified for the British 
participants. The implications of these fin-
dings are discussed from the perspectives of 
the infrahumanisation and ontologisation.   
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  Social psychology has often focused on the study of prejudice and 
stereotypes as phenomena of inter-group relations and studied their beha-
vioural expression in terms of evaluative judgements o f the out-group 
and/or in terms of unequal distribution of material and symbolic resources 
(Brown, 1995, 2000; Doise, 1978; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel 1974, 1981). Recent 
studies suggest that ethnic prejudice may go beyond mere evaluative judg-
ments, and may include semantic-anthropological considerations.  While 42      Psicología Política, Nº 30, Mayo 2005 
 
 
evaluative discrimination consists of judging out-groups in terms of posi-
tive versus negative attributes in order to confirm a difference between in-
group and out-group on valued dimensions, semantic-anthropological dis-
crimination involves judging out-groups in terms of natural and cultural 
characteristics (Moscovici and  Pérez, 1997; Pérez, Chulvi and  Alonso, 
2001). 
  Moscovici (1968) put forward the idea that nature and culture consti-
tute dimensions along which representations of human groups are organ-
ised. It is important therefore to look closer at these two concepts. Culture 
means “civilisation”, “human development”, “a general process of intellec-
tual, spiritual and aesthetic development” (Williams, 1988), which “begins 
at the point at which humans surpass whatever is simply given in their na-
tural inheritance” (Edgar and Sedgwick, 1999), while Nature is “the primi-
tive condition before human society”, “plants and creatures other than 
man”, (Williams, 1988), “the material that is subject to [a cultural] process 
of transformation, but it is not properly part of human society until it has 
been so transformed” (Edgar and Sedgwick, 1999: 256). Etymologically 
speaking, culture originally meant the cultivation of the land, as in agricul-
ture, and marked humans’ transition from a hunter-gathering state to a se-
dentary form of social organisation. Thus, culture was initially “a thorough-
ly material process, which was then metaphorically transposed to affairs of 
the spirit”, and its semantic origins indicate humanity’s “historic shift from 
rural to urban existence” (Eagleton, 2000). By contrast, nature is often de-
fined as what existed prior to culture or simply outside human society (Ed-
gar and Sedgwick, 1999), often viewed as inferior to culture and as some-
thing that needs to be dominated and controlled. In Western discourse, Na-
ture is commonly seen as the material necessary for the production of Cul-
ture. Strathern points out that often the dichotomy culture / nature revolves 
around the idea of domination and control, where “the wild is transformed 
into the domestic and the domestic contains within it primitive elements of 
its pre-domesticated nature” (1980: 181). This view of culture as dependent 
on the exploitation and transformation of nature is also present with Edgar 
and Sedgwick (1999) who argue that the cultivation of the natural world 
and the human ability to construct and build are fundamental elements of 
culture.  
  Culture is also often taken to mean civilisation, an achieved state or 
condition of organised social life, with emphasis on secular and progressive 
human self-development (Williams, 1988). Often, civilisation is contrasted 
with savagery and barbarism, where, etymologically speaking, civilisation 




settled and is set in contrast with the culture of the moving hordes (from the 
Old Turkic ordu), who are viewed as a threat
1. Following the meaning of 
civilisation, different cultures leave open the possibility of conflict as in 
Huntington’s (1996) thesis about the “clash of civilisations”, for some cul-
tures will be perceived as more or less “civilised” than others. 
  Culture has often been depicted as being in a relationship of domination 
of Nature: as Donna Haraway highlights, “nature is only the raw material of 
nature appropriated, preserved, enslaved, exalted or otherwise made flexi-
ble for disposal by culture in the logic of capitalist colonialism” (1989: 13). 
Donna Haraway (1991) has illustrated the power imbalance between 
humans and animals by showing how primatology and animal studies in 
general have been used as a tool to justify “domination based in differences 
seen as natural, given, inescapable, and therefore moral” (p.8). Interests of 
domination have given animals “a special status as natural objects that can 
show people their origin, and therefore their pre-rational, pre-management, 
pre-cultural essence”.  
  Given this view of Culture as an agentic and engaged control of Nature, 
one might inquire whether culture as a “historically created system of mea-
ning and significance” or as “a system of beliefs and practices in terms of 
which a group of human beings understand, regulate and structure their 
individual and collective lives” (Parekh, 2000: 143) would also encapsulate 
the idea of domination and transformation of nature. Following a paralle-
lism, it could be argued that just as culture, as a superordinate category, 
implies the idea of instrumental reason and control of nature, so human 
culture, in the sense of beliefs, symbolizations, norms and values, would 
imply the idea of control of human instinct, of surpassing whatever is given 
in humans’ natural inheritance. Thus, enculturation (the social process by 
which culture is learned and used by a human infant) would involve a po-
lishing of human nature, a sort of domestication at the human level, where-
by humans learn to dominate their instinct, express culturally accepted 
emotions and engage in socially sanctioned behaviours.  
  Following this line of thought, the “essence” of humanity in the West-
ern world is based on the passage from a state of nature to a state of culture, 
from wilderness and nomadic group behaviour to civilisation and sedentary 
life where one’s individuality is expressed and fulfilled. Representations of 
social groups might, therefore, be organised around the idea that some 
groups are closer to “fulfil their human potential” in the sense that they 
have domesticated their natural aspects and have achieved the civilised 
state. Indeed, Pérez and his colleagues (Pérez, Chulvi and Alonso 2001) 
suggested that when an ethnic minority constantly resists the majority’s 44      Psicología Política, Nº 30, Mayo 2005 
 
 
strategies of social integration, the majority attributes the minority an es-
sence different from the human one. They focused on the Gypsy minority 
in Spain and found that Gypsies were attributed more natural (or animal-
like) characteristics in the condition where participants were informed that 
Gypsies had not socially integrated despite the majority’s multiple efforts 
to convert them. This attribution of more animal -like characteristics serves 
as an explanation of why the minority has resisted social pressure to inte-
grate and has remained at the fringes of society. The majority attributes the 
absence of integration to the different essence of the minority, to their i n-
ability to leave their animal condition and creates a new ontology for them, 
excluding them from humanity.  To describe this process the concept of 
ontologisation has been put forward (Moscovici and Pérez 1997,  Pérez, 
Moscovici and Chulvi, 2002). Ontologisation consists of an operation of 
classification by which one minority can be represented not only as an out-
group but can also be represented as outside the social map of human iden-
tity. This exclusion of the realm of humanity goes beyond ideological pre-
judice (involving evaluation) and consists of a categorical prejudice (invol-
ving the essentialisation of groups) that serves to create social distance 
between groups or to deny similarities between majorities and minorities 
(Moscovici and Pérez 1997).  
  Recently, Chulvi and Pérez (2002) studied the social representations of 
ethnic minorities, including Gypsies, and found that categorising them in 
terms of nature as opposed to culture was more salient than evaluating 
them in terms of positive and negative attributes. They found that humans 
were characterised by reason, culture and autonomy, whereas animals were 
represented by  instinct,  nature, and  emotional dependence, with Gypsies 
and other ethnic minorities being  ascribed about a quarter of the positive 
animal attributes. Chulvi and Pérez found that the typical traits assigned to 
Gypsies suggested their having an essence different from that of humans, 
which functioned to explain why they have maintained their specific lifes-
tyle despite centuries of forced cultural assimilation. The study showed that 
Gypsies were represented as antisocial nomads with a questionable morali-
ty and a preference for isolation within a self-enclosed universe beyond the 
realm of the human species. 
  The process of ontologisation has obvious consequences for current 
multicultural societies, since the non-assimilation of minorities might throw 
them outside the boundaries of humanity. For example, Verkuyten (2001) 
analysed the rhetorical strategies used by majority members in the Nether-
lands to construct the behaviour and the practices of immigrants and ethnic 




was to present extreme cases of behaviour or violation of social norms and 
basic values to justify judgements of abnormality and accuse the minority. 
More importantly, majority members rejected the argument of cultural di-
versity to explain differences in the behaviour of ethnic minorities. Such an 
argument would have placed both groups (majority and m inority) in an 
intergroup perspective of evaluative differences. Instead people categorised 
minorities outside the boundaries of normal human behaviour (Chrysso-
choou 2004). Excluding the other from the realm of humanity may have 
disturbing consequences: Tajfel (1981, 1984) argued that dehumanising the 
out-groups can serve to exterminate them, as in the case of the Nazi Ger-
many.  
  In another line of research, Leyens and his colleagues (Leyens et al. 
2000, 2001) thought that  if people have a tendency to essentialise social 
groups they might do so not only at the level of cognitive abilities but also 
in terms of their ability to feel certain emotions. They distinguished bet-
ween primary emotions such as fear or disgust which are considered in 
common sense to be common to both animals and humans, and secondary 
emotions such as pride or remorse which are socially constructed and are 
attributed exclusively to humans. Leyens et al drew on this distinction to 
explore the type of emotions that people attribute to in-group and out-
group. In a series of mostly experimental studies (Gaunt et al. 2002, Leyens 
et al. 2001, Paladino et al. 2002), they found that people associated more 
primary rather than secondary emotions with out-groups, while they attri-
buted more secondary than primary emotions to their in-group. They called 
this phenomenon  infrahumanisation or lesser perceived humanity  of the 
out-group, meaning that out-groups are perceived as less human than the 
in-group. Contrary to ontologisation, infra-humanisation through the diffe-
rential attribution of emotions is not contingent on a history of failed assi-
milation and conversion, and is supposed to happen with all out-groups, 
regardless of their relationship with the in-group.  
  Despite this crucial difference, however, the two concepts (ontologisa-
tion and infra-humanisation) are close in the sense that they describe a 
process of denying humanity to social groups based on the distinction b e-
tween nature and culture. In that sense, it can be hypothesised that a genera-
lly devalued group such as the Gypsies will be both ontologised and infra-
humanised. If this is the case, despite their difference, the two concepts 
describe similar phenomena of dehumanisation. This is precisely what the 
present study sought to explore. 
  Moreover, the present study undertook to investigate the Gypsy minor-
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histories on the discrimination of Gypsies. While in Britain the Gypsies are 
a very small minority, in Romania they constitute an estimated ten percent 
of the population. Equally, a cross-cultural in a Western European and an 
Eastern European country study would counterbalance any possible Wes-
tern European bias in the data on the dehumanisation of the Gypsies. 
  In particular, the present research proposed to investigate whether eth-
nic majorities, British and Romanian, or the Gypsies, would be ascribed 
more cultural, or human-like, or more natural, or animal -like, characteris-
tics
2, in l ine with the thesis of ontologisation and whether they would be 
attributed more primary or more secondary emotions, in line with the con-
cept of infrahumanisation. 
  Firstly, it was expected that more natural characteristics would be at-
tributed to the Gypsies than to the ethnic in-group, whereas more cultural 
characteristics would be assigned to the in-group than to the Gypsies, and 
that the Gyspies would be attributed more natural than cultural characteris-
tics. Secondly, it was hypothesised that more secondary emotions would be 
attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, and that the Gypsies will be 
attributed more primary than secondary emotions. These hypotheses were 






  Initially a pilot study was carried out in Britain among 56 undergradu-
ate psychology students. Half of them were asked to name 20 characteris-
tics typical of humans and not of animals, 10 positive and 10 negative, whi-
le the other half were requested to name 20 characteristics typical of ani-
mals and not of humans, 10 positive and 10 negative. The most frequently 
mentioned characteristics were subsequently selected and included in the 
main study: 5 positive human (friendly, compassionate, intelligent, loyal, 
creative) 5 negative human (selfish, greedy, untruthful, prejudiced, cruel ), 5 
positive animal ( free, self-sufficient, unsophisticated, adaptable, group-
behaviour), and 5 negative animal (wild, noisy, dirty, aggressive, depen-
dent).  
  For practical reasons, no pilot study was carried out in Romania. 
However, a post-hoc study undertaken with 37 Romanian participants vali-
dated the results of the pilot study. The participants were requested to rate 
the 20 characteristics as either human or animal. A t-test indicated a signifi-




8.24, SD = 1.51) and the human characteristics rated as animal (M = 3.29, 
SD = 1.57), with t (36) = 33.06, p < 0.001. Another t-test revealed a signifi-
cant difference between the animal characteristics rated as animal (M = 
6.70, SD = 1.68) and the animal characteristics rated as human (M = 5.40, 
SD = 2.52), with t (36) = 24.25, p < 0.001.  
  The 37 Romanian participants were also asked to rate the 20 character-
istics on positivity and negativity. Their ratings coincided with the British 
participants’ ratings, with the exception of unsophisticated, which was ra-
ted negative by the Romanians. In addition, the Romanians were not clear 
as to whether cruel and  loyal were typically human and whether self-
sufficient and dependent were typically animal characteristics. Therefore 
these attributes were retrieved from the analysis. 
 
Participants  
  One hundred and fifty students, 73 British and 77 Romanian partic i-
pated in the study. Of the British sample, 13 were male and 62, female, 
with ages ranging from 18 to 50, M = 21.21, SD = 5.46, Median = 19. Of 
the Romanian sample, 19 were male and 57, female, with one data missing. 
Their ages ranged from 19 to 29, M = 21.82, SD = 1.66, Median = 21. All 
participants were British and Romanian citizens, respectively, and no parti-
cipants belonged to the Gypsy minority.  
 
Procedure 
  Each participant responded to a questionnaire asking them to attribute a 
range of emotions and a range of attributes to their respective in-group, 
British or Romanian, respectively, and to the Gypsies. The emotions had 
been selected to represent primary (joy, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, sur-
prise, protectiveness) and secondary emotions (affection, pride, admiration, 
remorse, conceit, nostalgia and rancour), as in Leyens et al 2001
3, while the 
attributes had been selected following a pilot study to represent either char-
acteristics that were particularly human or characteristics that were shared 
by humans and animals (see pilot above). The valence of the emotions and 
of the attributes had also been checked in the pilot.  
  It was found that the British evaluated more positively the secondary 
emotions (m=2.99) than did the Romanians (m=2.81) t (72) = 2.12, p<.05. 
Also in general for the British both the primary (m=3.14) and the secondary 
(m=3.32) emotions were judged as more important for people in their coun-
try than for the Romanians (primary m=2.81; secondary m=2.96; primary t 
(72) = 2.86, p<.01; secondary t (72) = 2.95, p<.01. 








  The 2(nationality: British/Romanians) x 4(attributes: culture to in-
group/ culture to out-group/ nature to in-group/ nature to out-group) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor yielded a significant 
main effect of attributes, F(3-444) = 115.29, p<.001 and a significant inter-
action between attributes and nationality, F(3-444) = 6.73, p<.001 (Multi-
variate tests attributes F(2-147) = 156.7, p<.001, and attributes by national-
ity F(2-147) = 6, p<.01). In this case the effect of nationality was not signi-
ficant (see table 1 for means and standards deviations).  
 
Table 1 
Means (and standard deviations) of the attribution of characteristics 







Gypsies  Total 
British  .24 (.19)  .17 (.17)  .21 (.16)  .48 (.20)  .27 (.14 ) 
Romanians  .44 (.17)  .21 (.17)  .25 (.14)  .56 (.20)  .36 (.14 ) 
Total  .34 (.21)  .19 (.17)  .23 (.15)  .51 (.20)   
 
Note. One-way ANOVAs revealed that the British and the Romanians differed on the attri-
bution of characteristics relating to culture when attributed to the in-group: culture in-group 
F(1-148)= 45.13, p<.001, and to nature when attributed to the Gypsies: nature to Gypsies 
F(1-148)= 5.64, p<.01, with Romanians assigning to their in-group more attributes relating 




  Further (see table 1 and figure 1), paired sample t-tests showed that the 
British did not assign differently attributes relating to nature and culture to 
their in-group. However, they followed the pattern expected by ontologisa-
tion as they ascribed more attributes relating to culture to the in-group than 
to the Gypsies, t (72) = 3.24, p<.01, less attributes relating to nature to the 
in-group than to the Gypsies, t (72) =  -9.40,  p<.001, and more attributes 
relating to nature than attributes relating to culture to the Gypsies, t (72) = 





Attribution of cultural and natural characteristics to the in-group and to Gypsies by 















  With the Romanians, all differences were significant in the direction 
expected by ontologisation (see table 1 and figure 1). They ascribed more 
attributes relating to culture to the in-group than to the Gypsies, t (76) = 
9.30,  p<.001, less attributes relating to nature to the in-group than to the 
Gypsies, t (76) = 12.55, p<.001, more attributes relating to nature than at-
tributes relating to culture to the Gypsies, t (76) = -12.74, p<.001, and more 
attributes relating to culture than to nature to the in-group, t (76) = 8.75, 
p<.001.  
  Thus, from these results it can be safely concluded that both national 
majorities ontologise the Gypsies in line with the first hypothesis. 
 
Infrahumanisation 
  The 2(nationality: British/Romanians) x 4(emotions: primary to i n-
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anova with repeated measures on the last factor yielded a significant main 
effect of emotions F(2.46-364.04 Greenhouse–Geisser correction) = 4.90, 
p<.01 and a significant interaction between emotions and nationality 
F(2.46-363.04 Greenhouse–Geisser correction) = 13.42, p<.001 (Multivari-
ate tests emotions F(3-146)=4.40, p<.01 and emotions by nationality F(3-
146) = 14.47, p<.001). However, the effect of nationality was not signifi-




Means (and standard deviations) of the attribution of Emotions 
 










British  1.76 (.89)  2.41 (.98)  2.41 (.83)  1.59 (.76)  2.04 (.04) 
Romanians  2.02 (.79)  1.98 (.86)  2.01 (.98)  2.29 (.79)  2.08 (.04) 
Total  1.9 (.85)  2.19 (.95)  2.20 (.93)  1.95 (.85)   
 
 
  Further (see table 2 and figure 2), paired sample t-tests showed that the 
British followed the pattern expected by infrahumanisation as they attrib-
uted less primary emotions to the in-group than to the Gypsies, t (72) = -
4.65, p<.001, more secondary emotions to the in-group than the to the Gyp-
sies, t (72) = 6.99, p<.001, more primary emotions than secondary emotions 
to the Gypsies, t (72) = 5.47, p<.001 and more secondary emotions to the 
ingroup than primary emotions, t (72) = 3.7, p<.001.  
  However, for the Romanians this was not true as the attribution of pri-
mary and secondary emotions to the Gypsies approached significance but 
the difference was on the opposite direction from the one expected, i.e. 
more secondary than primary emotions were attributed to the Gypsies t (76) 
=  -1.92,  p=.06.  Moreover, the crucial attribution of secondary emotions 
between ingroup and Gypsies was significant but again in the opposite di-
rection, i.e. more secondary emotions to the outgroup t (76) = -1.99, p=.05. 
The results seem to indicate that Gypsies are not infra-humanised by the 
Romanians. This contradicts the hypothesis according to which both n a-
tional groups will infra-humanise the Gypsies. 





Attribution of primary and secondary emotions to in-group and to the Gypsies by 

















  The present study examined the ontologisation and infrahumanisation 
of the Gypsy minority by the British and the Romanian majorities. The 
findings supported all three hypotheses relating to the thesis of ontologisa-
tion, in both national samples: more cultural characteristics were attributed 
to in-group than to the Gypsies, more natural characteristics were assigned 
to the Gypsies than to the in-group, and more natural than cultural characte-
ristics were attributed to the Gypsies. These results therefore suggest that 
the ontologisation of the Gypsies occurs in both Britain and Romania, and, 
taking into account the previous research on the ontologisation of Gypsies 
in Spain, it could be argued that the ontologisation of Gypsies seems to 
constitute a pan-European phenomenon. It could be said that this apparent 52      Psicología Política, Nº 30, Mayo 2005 
 
 
cross-cultural dehumanisation of the Gypsies may function as a common 
marker for cultural identity, as Pérez and his colleagues suggest, or may 
reflect the low social status that the Gypsy minority has across European 
countries. 
  Regarding infrahumanisation, the hypothesis according to which more 
secondary emotions would be attributed to in-group than to out-group was 
supported only for the British participants, as they attributed significantly 
more secondary emotions to their in-group than to the Gypsies. However, 
in the case of the Romanian participants, the hypothesis was not supported, 
as the Romanians did not attribute significantly more secondary emotions 
to their in-group than to the Gypsies. Similarly, the hypothesis according to 
which the out-group would be attributed more primary than secondary 
emotions was only supported by the British participants, who assigned mo-
re primary than secondary emotions to the Gypsies. By contrast, the Roma-
nian participants attributed the Gypsies more secondary than primary emo-
tions, thus failing to support the hypothesis.  
  We have no explanation for the present findings which only partially 
support the theory of infrahumanisation. The results seem to suggest that 
the Gypsies are infrahumanised by the British, but not by the Romanians. 
Consequently the present findings somewhat beg the question about the 
universality of the  process of infrahumanisation, and to a certain extent 
challenge the assumption of infrahumanisation as a good indicator of 
dehumanisation. Furthermore, given that the Romanians in this study onto-
logised the Gypsies the absence of infrahumanisation from their part raises 
the question concerning the relation between ontologisation and infra-
humanisation. 
  Although, only speculations can be advanced at this stage, a suggestion 
can be made concerning the relation of these two concepts. Although, the 
post-hoc tests showed that both the British and the Romanian participants 
culturally valued the secondary emotions significantly more than the pri-
mary ones, they also indicated that the British rated the secondary emotions 
significantly more positively than did the Romanians. It could therefore be 
argued that the British are treating the emotions as a more valuable re-
source than the Romanians and they reserve them for their own group. If in 
the Western world being human is constructed in contrast to the animal 
then the characteristics believed as being uniquely human are more posi-
tively valued (irrespective of their particular evaluative content).  Thus, 
these characteristics will be reserved to the ingroup in the same sense that 
even negatively evaluated attributes that are, however, linked with agentic 




Fiske 2001). In this sense, the process of infrahumanisation consists in de-
nying valued symbolic resources (this time not cognitive but emotional) to 
an out-group.  The fact that human-like emotions are denied to the out-
group shows, perhaps, that animals, as a devalued out-group, are used to 
delegitimise other out-groups, as was the case with the use of the attribute 
Jew in Italy to characterise other groups (Volpato and Durante 2003). In 
that sense, infrahumanisation, following an unequal distribution of emo-
tions, is not based necessarily on an essentialisation of the social group but 
constitutes the expression of an evaluative prejudice. 
  This view of infra-humanisation does not deny the importance of the 
antithesis Nature/Culture in Western common sense.  On the contrary it 
shows how much the identity of the human category is based on its differ-
entiation from its natural aspects. However, conceptualising infra-huma-
nisation as an expression of evaluative prejudice could allow, perhaps, for 
results such as the ones displayed by the Romanians here who ontologised 
the Gypsies but do not infra-humanised them. 
  In the present research we started with the idea that ontologisation and 
infra-humanisation are different aspects of the same process of dehumani-
sation. The results of our Romanian sample cast some doubts. Why would 
the same people be ready to attribute more animal-like traits than human-
like trai ts to Gypsies but not more primary (animal -like) than secondary 
(human-like) emotions? Perhaps the answer is to be found in a closer exa-
mination of the concept of ontologisation and the semantic qualities of the 
attributes.  
  In this study, following the literature, people were asked during a pilot 
study to produce attributes either typically human or typically animal. The 
attributes retained were friendly, compassionate, intelligent, creative, gree-
dy, selfish untruthful and prejudiced for humans and free, unsophisticated, 
adaptable, group-behaviour, wild, noisy, dirty and aggressive for the ani-
mal. However, if for methodological reasons people were asked to produce 
these attributes in relation to humans and animals, the phenomenon of onto-
logisation is not b ased on this distinction but on the opposition between 
nature and culture. As discussed earlier nature is considered the primitive 
condition before human society (Williams, 1988), and culture begins at the 
point at which humans surpass their natural inheritance (Edgar and Sedg-
wick, 1999) and where the wild is domesticated (Strathern, 1980). If we 
look closely at the attributes produced spontaneously by the participants we 
could see that their content reflects this division. From one part we have the 
free from societal constrains, wild, noisy and dirty being that reacts instinc-
tively ( aggressive, unsophisticated), lives as an aggregate ( group beha-54      Psicología Política, Nº 30, Mayo 2005 
 
 
viour) and passively adapts itself (adaptable) to the situations. This repre-
sentation characterises the primitive state of nature. On the other hand, we 
have the intelligent and creative being that, with these qualities, domesti-
cates its natural instincts and the natural forces; it constructs artefacts and 
can be friendly and compassionate but also selfish and greedy, prejudiced 
and untruthful. These are relational qualities that arise in a societal organ-
ised condition. One could see the “division of the individual in what is 
constrain, forbidden, civilised and what corresponds to the spontaneity, the 
pleasure, and the indomitable force of the affective impulses” (Moscovici 
1994: 25). According to Moscovici (1994: 29) the rupture between nature 
and society is to be found in the “amalgam between the individual, the 
animal, the instinct and the collective from one part and the human, the 
reason and the law on the other”. The former corresponds at the absence of 
order and differentiation and is threatening whereas the latter represents 
societal organisation and distinction. 
  Humans, in the Western thought (both common and scientific) are ex-
pected to surpass the natural collective characterised by anarchy and to 
evolve towards a societal collective viewed both as constrain and as an 
accomplishment. Thus, those, as the Gypsies, that were not able to integrate 
more complex forms of organisation belong to a separate ontology. Their 
ontological status facilitates their exclusion, their discrimination and even 
their extermination.  
  Of course, the results presented here can only be a starting point for 
discussing these ideas. The present research is, in our knowledge, the first 
were the infra-humanisation of an outgroup did not occur. More research is 
needed to clarify the conditions under which the phenomenon is absent. In 
particular, more research is needed in order to clarify the relation between 
ontologisation and infra-humanisation. A first path to follow might be the 
one suggested here, namely to investigate whether infra-humanisation is 
part of a process of evaluative prejudice based on the use of the animals as 
a devalued outgroup to delegitimise other groups and whether ontologisa-
tion constitutes the outcome of a process of classification organised by the 
antithesis between nature and culture.  
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1 Regarding the concepts of civis and ordu, please refer to the article in The Guardian re-
garding the Gypsies: Acceptable hatred: Beneath the enduring hostility to Gypsies lies an 
ancient envy of the nomadic life. George Monbiot, Tuesday November 4, 2003 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1077154,00.html  
2 Here, natural attributes are those shared by animals and humans, whereas cultural attrib-
utes are uniquely humans. 
3 Following the post-hoc study where participants in both countries were asked to judge the 
emotions in relation to whether they were typically human or animal, it was found that 
affection, although considered by Leyens et al. a secondary emotion was judged as a primary 
emotion. In addition although disgust was considered in the literature as a primary emotion, 
participants rated it as a secondary one. Thus, these two emotions did not take part in the 
analysis. 
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